#### EHzürich



# Handling Cyber Incidents & Cyber Crisis: terminology, perspective & attribution





«Cyber incidents are a bit like a bar brawl – you might have a pretty good idea who started it, but you will never be absolutely sure!»

## Content

Terminology & key issues in dealing with cyber-incident and cyber-crisis!

- 1. Introduction
  - Main issues & goals
- 2. Emergency & Crisis Management
  - What defines a crisis situation and what are the challenges?
  - How does an emergency evolve into a crisis?
- 3. Terminology
  - «Cyber Crisis» terminology in public and private domain
- 4. (Cyber) Incident and (Cyber) Crisis Management
  - How does an incident become a crisis?
  - What defines a cyber incident and crisis?
  - Similarities & Differences to general crisis management

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
- 5. Attribution and Perception in the Threat Typology
- 6. Next steps & Questions

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## 2. Crisis & Emergency: How does an emergency become a crisis?


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## 2. Crisis Management: Main Challenges




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## 3. Terminology & increased use






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
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## 3. Terminology: from data theft incident to global shock



«One or many events which lead to a complete or largescale outage of the world wide web or one of its services. These events can be triggered intentionally (e.g. by paralyzing a internet backbone) or without malicious intent (natural causes, e.g. leading to a power outage and cascading effects for the world wide web infrastructure). To be a crisis, a big part of the population must be affected directly throughout days.»



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## 3. Terminology: Conclusion

- Crisis combined with cyber is rarely defined, increasing the vagueness of both terms even more
- Overlap between different spheres (business, governments, I.O.) pretty vague
- «Cyber crisis» is used on three different organizational levels: strategic, operational and technical
- Initiatives to consolidate are there, but very difficult due to different perspective, priorities and interdisciplinary character




## 4. Cyber Crisis Management: Introduction

- Cyber-related crisis are basically the same as general crisis, just with a cyber component. Consequently, managing a cyber-crisis doesn't substantially diverge from general crisis management!
- «National Crisis Management for Crisis with Cyber characteristic»
- Crisis understanding is taken from the general crisis management framework: it becomes a crisis when it exceeds the emergency-frame and needs decisions on a strategic level!



## 4. Crisis Management Main Challenges – bringing in the Cyber component



«Intention may be the only line separating the attack from the accident.»



## 5. Threat landscape: attribution aspect

<ul> <li>States:</li> <li>Numerous states have substantial capabilities</li> <li>Wide range of activities</li> <li>Attribution varies depending on goals of activity and operation itself!</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Corporations:</li> <li>Potentially significant cyber capabilities</li> <li>Activities: Wide range of activities</li> <li>Attribution difficult, as success of operations will depend on remaining clandestine and therefore remaining unidentified!</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Hacktivists/Cyber Fighters:</li> <li>Very heterogeneous group and therefore motivation and goals</li> <li>Activities: Ideological support</li> <li>Attribution mostly less of a problem due to goals of activity!</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Cyber Terrorists:</li> <li>Potentially harming national security and society</li> <li>Activities: High-key attacks</li> <li>Attribution mostly less of a problem due to goals of activity!</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Cybercriminals:</li> <li>Engaging in illegal/criminal activities in cyberspace with the goal of gaining profit</li> <li>Activities: Various kind of services</li> <li>Attribution will be very difficult in most cases, as remaining unknown is key to establish business!</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Internal actors/Employees:</li> <li>Very heterogeneous activities, but big issue</li> <li>Activities: Malicious and non-malicious</li> <li>Attribution will vary on a case-to-case basis, but mostly possible!</li> </ul>

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## 5. Threat landscape & attribution in Cyber-Crisis Management: Trends & Conclusion

- Increased sophistication of attacks
- Especially nation-states have developed substantial capabilities
- Additional challenges increase problem of managing a cyber incident & cyber-crisis:
  - Terminology & attribution: When does an incident become a crisis?
  - Information & attribution
    - What happened and who is responsible?
    - Time sensitivity
    - Diverging interests
  - Increased interconnectedness = more coordination
  - Less tested and experienced cooperation networks
  - o Dynamic due to new technological developments (big data, internet of things)
- Law-enforcement becoming increasingly successful
- More data on cyber-threats also means better quality of available information
- Increased cooperation for assessing and defending against cyber-threats



## 6. Next steps

- Increase bodies for cooperation and collaboration
  - Private companies, public sector
  - International cooperation
- Common understanding and terminology
  - Private companies, public sector, international
- Preparedness & Trust
  - Lack of experience with high-profile cyber-crisis situations
  - Increase trust between all stakeholders
- Intelligence & investigation capacities
  - Reducing the challenges of attribution
  - Code of conduct / legal questions: e.g. "hack back"





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## **Questions?**

